The preamble to the Constitution declares India to be a Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic and a welfare state committed to secure justice, liberty and equality for the people and for promoting fraternity, dignity of the individual and unity and integrity of the nation.
The objectives specified in the preamble constitute the basic structure of the Indian Constitution which cannot be amended. Although Article 1 of the Constitution says India shall be a Union of States, the Constitution provides for a federal structure with clear division of powers between the Centre and the states, each empowered by the Constitution to enact and legislate within their sphere of activity.
The seventh schedule contains three legislative lists which enumerate subjects of administration viz union, state and concurrent legislative lists. The Central Government enjoys exclusive power to legislate on the subjects mentioned in the Union list.
The state governments have full authority to legislate on the subjects of the state list. And both the Centre and the state can legislate on the subjects mentioned in the concurrent list with the residuary powers vested in the Central Government. It can be said that India has cooperative federalism. While the Lok Sabha consists of the elected representatives of people, the Rajya Sabha consists of representatives elected by the state legislative assemblies.
The President is the nominal head of the state and the Parliament. In actual practice, the Prime Minister, aided by the Council of Ministers, heads the executive and is responsible for governance.
An impartial judiciary, independent of the legislature and the executive, is one of the main features of the Constitution. The States Explore. The States in Part B of The Union Territories Explore. The Panchayats Explore. The Municipalities Explore. The Cooperative Societies Explore. The Scheduled and Triba Relations between the U Finance, Property, Cont Trade , Commerce and In Services Under the Unio Tribunals Explore.
Without such a provision the Dewan cannot be held responsible in the manner contemplated, for he might plead that he was compelled to carry out the order of the Sovereign, though unadvisable or improper. The Dewan shall have free access to the British Resident, and may take his advice on all measures of importance. As so much responsibility will be devolved on the Dewan, he will gladly avail himself of such a provision.
The wisest Maharajah and the wisest Dewan might look for benefit from the advice of the British Resident. The more they are sincerely anxious for a good administration the more readily will they seek to consult with the Resident. If any unlawful act is done, the agent instrumental in the doing of such act shall himself be fully responsible to the laws, and cannot plead as an excuse obedience to the orders of the Sovereign.
This is also a valuable principle of the British Constitution. It is absolutely necessary in the interests of the people, and also in the interests of the Sovereign personally. It is intended to deter any agent of the Sovereign from undertaking to carry out any unlawful order. It is also intended to give complete effect to the provision that the Sovereign shall act through his responsible Minster, the Dewan.
The Sovereign will not administer justice personally, as he has delegated this power to the constituted judiciary. It would be obviously impossible for ordinary Sovereigns personally to administer justice. In Native States there is a perpetual desire, induced in the Sovereign by interested persons, to undertake personally a work which requires special qualifications, which a Sovereign is not expected to possess. The more a Sovereign yields to this desire, the more likely it is that justice would be perverted or sold.
The Sovereign shall not constitute any Special Court to administer special justice in any particular case, but may direct any already existing court to be strengthened by temporarily transferring to it any Judge or Judges of other Constituted Courts.
This is designed to prevent a Court being arbitrarily and specially constituted to secure a given result in any particular case. As such, the provision forms an important safeguard. It has its analogy in the English Bill of Rights. The Sovereign shall in no case reverse the acquittal or enhance the sentence pronounced by a competent Court of Justice. This is also absolutely necessary to protect the subject against the effects of anger, or malice, or vindictiveness, or at least ignorance, on the part of courtiers about the Sovereign.
The Sovereign may, under the advice of his responsible Minister, mitigate any sentence, if proper grounds exist, by reducing it, or commuting it for any other. And the Sovereign may, under similar advice, grant free pardons after trial, conviction, and sentence, in cases wherein error is patent or serious doubt has arisen about the correctness of the conviction. These provisions again are derived from the British Constitution. The Sovereign ought to be able to exercise clemency, a highly popular virtue, within proper bounds.
Even should he ever err in the exercise of those prerogatives, no great mischief is likely to occur. The Dewan will, of course, be responsible to prevent error as far as possible.
These provisions are designedly so worded as to cut off the power which is sometimes exercised by the Sovereign, of pardoning criminal convicts on joyful occasions, such as the coronation, the birth of an heir, recovery from serious illness, and so on. Such pardons cannot but produce a baneful effect on the community. It is impossible to see why an occasion of personal joy on the part of the Sovereign should bring about a suspension of just penal laws in particular instances.
This provision, however, is not intended to interfere with the power of granting pardons to approvers for securing evidence. A special law will, of course, regulate the granting of such pardons. Every grant of pardon or mitigation of sentence, carried out under the foregoing provisions, shall be immediately notified in the Official Gazette, together with a brief and clear statement of the reasons which dictated it.
The object here is to enable public opinion to operate as a check against the abuse of the power of remitting or mitigating a judicial sentence. No sentence of death shall be carried out unless after confirmation by the Sovereign under the advice of the responsible Dewan, who will consult the British Resident whenever he the Dewan finds difficulty in arriving at a definite conclusion himself.
Life is so sacred, and a deprivation of it constitutes such an irrevocable and irremediable punishment, that too much caution cannot be brought to bear in this direction. As the provision is framed, no one will forfeit his life unless the highest judicial tribunal, the Dewan and Sovereign, and in many cases the British Resident, all err together, which is an improbable contingency.
As the Dewan is fully responsible, he will readily and often avail himself of the latter part of the provision. In very clear cases he may not do so, but act on his own responsibility. This is intended to put an end to the unbounded license enjoyed in most Native States in the use of public funds.
A fixed Civil List is manifestly one of the most essential requisites and characteristics of a well-ordered Government. The provision will bring about a useful separation between the private expenses of the Sovereign, and the public expenditure of the country.
It will induce economy on the part of the Sovereign; it will facilitate the appropriation of the surplus revenue of the county for purposes of public utility. Where every rupee of the public revenue is looked upon as the private property of the Sovereign, extravagance must very often prevail, and useful outlays on public works must generally be grudged.
The latter part of the provision is necessary in view to give effect to the former. Expenses appertaining to the Civil List have a strong tendency to lurk under other heads, and this ought, by all means, to be prevented.
The opportunity has been taken to make the publication of the Annual Administration Report obligatory, as it will bring the whole administration under wholesome public criticism. An administration which has to be exposed to public view can seldom go far wrong. The public revenues shall not be answerable for private debts incurred by the Sovereign or any member of the Royal Family. Without such a provision as this, the fixity of the Civil List would be utterly a sham.
This is too evident to require explanation. No suit shall lie in any court against the Sovereign or any member of the Royal Family on account of private debts incurred by them. There is nothing, however, to prevent them from discharging their debts as matters of honour and moral obligation.
Indeed, it is to be hoped that no Royal Family will be so depraved as to repudiate a just debt, in consequence of the legal irresponsibility conferred by this provision. Moneylenders, however, will be quite aware of this legal irresponsibility and take the risk with their eyes fully open. The Sovereign shall not make any permanent alienation of the land or other public revenues to any extent in favour of any private individual or any corporation unless under the sanction of a specific law regularly enacted and promulgated in due course.
This provision appears very necessary for the very preservation of the revenues. It will restrain undue liberality and ill-judged favouritism, so much prevalent in Native Courts. It will protect the Sovereign against constant importunities and intrigues, and thus make his position easy and comfortable. Where, however, a grant is justified by the circumstances of any case, a law may without difficulty be passed, specially authorizing the Dewan to make a permanent alienation in a given case.
Those who must be parties to the passing of the law may be expected to exercise due care and caution in regard to the public revenue while yielding to just claims. The most important effect of this provision will be that grants by the Sovereign, such as are hereby interdicted, would, if ever made, be illegal and invalid and, as such, revocable by that Sovereign himself at a subsequent period, or by his successors; thus permanent evil will be prevented.
No public demand shall be remitted or suspended in part or whole, except on principles of public utility and general applicability. The design of this is to prevent venality, favouritism, and inequality. The principle is very often violated in Native States in reference to personal or private influences.
The public revenues, or any surplus arising therefrom, shall not be applied to any but public purposes and the good of the country. This provision is not rendered unnecessary by the fixation of the Civil List. The object is to prevent undue grants of the public revenue to purposes other than the good of the country.
It is desirable, for instance, to deter grants, excessive grants, to foreign institutions, merely in compliance with a morbid desire for the reputation of liberality. On that day, the Assembly ceased to exist, transforming itself into the Provisional Parliament of India until a new Parliament was constituted in Sessions of the Constituent Assembly First Session:.
Sixth Session:. Ninth Session:. Tenth Session:. Name of the Committee. Committee on the Rules of Procedure. Rajendra Prasad. Steering Committee. Finance and Staff Committee. Credential Committee. Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar. House Committee. Pattabhi Sitaramayya. Order of Business Committee.
Ad hoc Committee on the National Flag. Committee on the Functions of the Constituent Assembly. States Committee. Jawaharlal Nehru.
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